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International Law: A Welfarist Approach
Eric A. Posner1
September 6, 2005

Abstract. This paper evaluates international law from a welfarist perspective.
Global welfarism requires that international law advance the well being of
everyone in the world, and scholars influenced by global welfarism and similar
cosmopolitan principles have advocated radical restructuring of international
law. But global welfarism is subject to several constraints, including (1)
heterogeneity of preferences of the world population, which produces the state
system; (2) agency costs, which produce imperfect governments; and (3) the
problem of collective action. These constraints place limits on what policies
motivated by global welfarism can achieve, and explain some broad features of
international law that otherwise remain puzzling. These features include the
central place of state sovereignty in international law despite the moral
arbitrariness of borders; the weakness of multilateral treaties; the limited role of
individual liability in international law; the predominantly legislative nature of
international institutions and the weakness of executive and judicial institutions;
and the absence of redistributive obligations in international law.

INTRODUCTION
International law scholarship lacks a well defined and broadly accepted
normative framework that can be used to evaluate the doctrines of international
law and to generate proposals for reform. Scholars debate the merits of particular
doctrines either by appealing to other doctrines or broad principles said to be
immanent in international law, or by claiming to derive their conclusions from
normative assumptions that are rarely articulated or justified with any precision.
The first approach is circular, the second leaves the debates mired in uncertainties
about first principles. What is needed is a framework that is rooted in political
morality while being precise enough to allow sufficiently defined conclusions.
This paper argues that a useful framework would have two elements: welfarism
and a realistic understanding of institutional constraints. The argument, in brief, is
that institutionally constrained welfarism shows the advantages of the state system
1
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and some other important features of international law, and suggests problems
with many proposals for international legal reform that can be found in the
literature.
As an illustration of the problem with current scholarship, consider the
debate about NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Nearly everyone
recognizes that this intervention violated international law. Under the UN charter,
crossborder military force may be used in self-defense or with the authorization of
the UN Security Council;2 neither of these conditions was met in Kosovo. At the
same time, the intervention probably saved thousands of lives, even a genocide.
Was it justified? Some commentators condemned the intervention because it
violated international law but did not address the question whether international
law that prohibited states from preventing a genocide was worth defending.3
Others concluded that the war was “illegal but legitimate.”4 This conclusion
concedes that an illegal act can be morally justified, but then the question is, How
should the law be changed so that “legitimate” action is permitted?
Several possibilities have been discussed in the literature. One argument is
that states should have the unilateral right to engage in humanitarian intervention.5
This argument has raised a concern about pretext: if such a right exists, won’t
some states use humanitarian goals as a pretext for aggressive war? To prevent
reliance on pretexts, some scholars argue that only the United Nations Security
Council should have the power to authorize humanitarian intervention.6 But that is
the status quo, and anyway the Security Council is controlled by powerful states
which will not act in the global interest. For this reason, the United Nations
system must be revised so that it will be more democratic: a democratic United
Nations would authorize justified humanitarian interventions. But giving each
state one vote would not be consistent with democracy, since some states are huge
and others are tiny. Therefore, voting must be based on population, and, further,
authoritarian states must be deprived of voting rights in the United Nations if they
do not allow their citizens to vote for delegates.7 But, as these considerations
show, the state system is arbitrary anyway, and sovereignty should be
2
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“decentralized,” so that there is a system of overlapping jurisdiction based on the
consent of the governed.8 Or, a world government is the only really effective way
to ensure that human rights atrocities can be addressed or prevented.9 But a world
government is not realistic, nor is UN reform; therefore, the European states (but
not the United States, which cannot be trusted) should form a pact obligating
members to cooperate in humanitarian interventions when necessary.10
For all of the philosophical sophistication of the scholars involved, this
debate has a fruitless and ungrounded quality. Why exactly is a world government
off limits, if it indeed is? 11 And if it is off limits, because unrealistic, then why
should UN reform or the European compact or the decentralization of sovereignty
be considered within limits? The scholars all agree on the larger end of preventing
atrocities.12 Their proposals differ radically not because of disagreement on ends,
but disagreement about what is institutionally possible. But none of the authors
cited for the views described above provides even a cursory theory of institutional
constraints. So their main source of disagreement is not even discussed.
The larger point is that reform of international law is possible, and
normative arguments can be brought to bear, but there are, in Jack Goldsmith’s
words, “plausibility constraints” that limit the universe of possible reforms.13
8
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Goldsmith argues that people are essentially self-interested, or at least not willing
to make the sacrifices demanded by the philosophers; that governments and other
institutions, by design, advance their interests, and especially when these
institutions are democratic; and therefore institutional reform that could address
global problems in a cosmopolitan spirit is not possible. Still, reform of
international institutions is possible and has occurred from time to time, and there
must be some reforms that are better than other reforms. The question is, what
constrains reform of international law; what makes some reform proposals
realistic and others unrealistic?
In this paper, I try to answer this question. I argue that for proposals of
international legal reform to be institutionally plausible, they must assume the
existence of (1) heterogeneous preferences among the world population, which
give rise to the state system, (2) agency costs, which give rise to the imperfection
of governments, and (3) the collective action problem. In such a world,
international legal reform is possible but highly limited. For expository
convenience, I assume that international legal reform is justified to the extent that
it enhances global welfare – the well being of everyone living in the world. I
argue that even if we all have a moral obligation to advance global welfarism, the
implications for international law are limited. Some frequently criticized features
of existing international law can be defended on global welfarist premises, within
the constraints created by heterogeneity of preferences, agency costs, and
collective action problems.
In brief, the argument is this. Populations have, over the centuries, divided
themselves up into political groupings that today take the form of nation states.
The size and scope of nation states reflect much historical contingency, but
beyond this is a basic tradeoff between the heterogeneity of populations and
economies of scale.14 Increasing economies of scale, driven by technological
change, give advantages to people who are members of large self-regulating
populations, but when people’s tastes and values are too heterogeneous,
sovereignty is impossible. Thus, the world is divided among dozens of
independent states. When people divide themselves into groups such as nation
states, regional and global public goods are not created, and instead nation states
have an incentive to externalize costs on people living outside their borders. The
function of international law is to correct these problems and enable people to
obtain public goods of regional and global scale. But international law can exist
only as long states support it, and thus, standard doctrine acknowledges, all, or
nearly all, states must consent to a rule before it can be deemed to be a part of
14
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international law. Several things follow from this. Because people have no
interest in transferring significant resources to those living in other countries,
international law does not require wealthy states to aid the poor; it only requires
states (rich and poor) to cooperate. Further, cooperation for the purpose of
creating public goods is limited by agency costs and collective action problems.
Because citizens cannot easily monitor and sanction governments that act against
their interest, governments will not always agree to international law that benefits
their own citizens. And because there is no world government, international law
can exist as an effective constraint only when states can overcome the collective
action problem. The latter suggests that narrow international agreements,
involving few states, are likely to be more effective than large multilateral
conventions.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Part I discusses the philosophical
literature in more detail, and shows how radically different reform proposals flow
not from philosophical disagreement but from unstated assumptions about
institutional constraints. This discussion helps motivate my focus, in the rest of
the paper, on institutions.
Part II discusses my main assumptions: (1) that international law should
maximize global welfare; (2) that preferences are heterogeneous; (3) that agency
costs exist and therefore governments are imperfect; and (4) that enforcement is
limited. The first assumption is likely to be controversial but it is mainly an
analytic convenience, and the argument does not turn on it in any substantial way.
The other three assumptions are about the institutional constraints on welfare
maximization, and I discuss the extent to which they are accurate, and how they
might be varied.
Part III discusses the implications of these assumptions for international
law. I discuss some general features of international law, including sovereign
equality, state responsibility, the central importance of sovereignty, and the
predominantly legislative nature of the international legal system (and lack of
adjudicative and executive resources). It is not my claim, however, that
international law as it currently exists is welfare-maximizing or largely welfaremaximizing beyond its very general contours; too many empirical questions and
other imponderables would make such a conclusion hasty.
I. THE LITERATURE: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The literature on international legal reform is vast; for expository
convenience, I will discuss a small subset dealing with the problem of

6

humanitarian intervention. The government of a small state commits atrocities
against its own citizens, perhaps even genocide. The state could be Uganda in
1971-79, Cambodia in 1975, Serbia in the 1990s, Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in
1994, or Sudan today. The government is impervious to diplomatic and economic
pressure; indeed, economic pressure might further harm the victims of the
government without affecting its leaders. Under international law, a foreign
government has no right to launch a military invasion in order to stop atrocities
from occurring in another state. What should the governments of other states do?
One possible answer is that foreign governments should do nothing
because they have no right to interfere with the domestic policy of the state in
question. This answer is, today, accepted by virtually no respectable philosopher
or lawyer. All of the disagreement concerns the extent of the humanitarian
catastrophe before intervention is justified. Walzer thinks there must be mass
murder, enslavement, or expulsion; others think that intervention may be justified
if human rights are violated on a large scale or democracy does not exist.15 These
disagreements reflect philosophical and empirical disagreement that are not of
concern here.
Most debate today concerns legal and institutional reform. The reason is
that there are many cases where everyone agrees that humanitarian intervention
should occur, and yet it does not occur, or it does occur but illegally, as in
Kosovo.
The most common position among international lawyers appears to be that
the status quo is acceptable.16 Under the current system, humanitarian intervention
can occur only if authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations.
However, the Security Council has never authorized a military intervention to
stop genocide or other crimes against humanity. So staying with the status quo
implicitly accepts this state of affairs, presumably on the ground that more
permissive rules would permit unjustified military interventions. These unjustified
military interventions would, perhaps, be worse than the humanitarian
interventions forgone because of the strict rules currently in place.
15
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in The Law of Humanitarian Intervention, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political
Dilemma 204, 227 (J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane eds. 2003) (discussing the intervention
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Philosophers and philosophically inclined lawyers do not approve of the
status quo, however. They have proposed various imaginative reforms.
Brian Barry argues that military intervention for humanitarian reasons is
sometimes justified but the problem “with the current statist system is that
decisions are taken in an ad hoc way, and this is equally true whether the action is
unilateral or taken under the auspices of the Security Council.”17 To solve this
problem and related problems, what is needed is a world government or, if that is
impossible, “the creation of an international legal system that takes precedence
over those of individual states.”18 Barry does not describe this legal system or
explain how it would be possible if a world government is not.
Peter Singer argues that states should engage in humanitarian intervention
because national sovereignty has no moral weight and rescuing individuals from
human rights atrocities does. However, he believes that if states were permitted to
decide for themselves whether humanitarian intervention is justified, they would
use humanitarian intervention as a pretext for aggressive war, plunging the world
into chaos. Therefore, an independent institution such as the United Nations must
have the responsibility for deciding whether humanitarian intervention is justified,
and states must be bound to comply with the United Nations’ judgment. The
problem with this suggestion, Singer continues, is that the United Nations is not a
democratic body; indeed, authoritarian states have veto power. Singer concludes
that the United Nations must be reformed so that it is more democratic. In
particular, he argues that all states should send delegates to the United Nations in
proportion to their population; these delegates would be democratically elected,
and thus would be representatives of people rather than of states; the United
Nations would supervise the elections; and authoritarian states that refuse to allow
such elections would be limited to one delegate.19
Allen Buchanan agrees that states should engage in humanitarian
intervention. However, he has little faith in the United Nations and does not
believe that in the near future it can be reformed. Instead, he argues that the
wealthy liberal democracies (except the United States, which lacks international
17
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legitimacy, in his view) should enter a treaty that compels them to engage in
humanitarian intervention when human rights violations in a target country
exceed a threshold. “Of course any attempt to construct a coalition of democratic,
human-rights respecting states for humanitarian intervention would require the
richer European states to do something they have not done in fifty years: make a
serious investment in military capacity rather than depending upon the United
States.”20 Nonetheless, Buchanan’s main worry is not that the Europeans would
refuse to form such a coalition but that the United States would block the
formation of such a coalition.
Thomas Pogge does not address humanitarian intervention in any detail
but seems willing to consider it, if it takes place under the auspices of a
multilateral body (p. 153). But he thinks that human rights atrocities would be a
much less significant problem in a world that looked like the following:
What we need is both centralization and decentralization – a kind of
second-order decentralization away from the now dominant level of the
state. Thus, persons should be citizens of, and govern themselves through,
a number of political units of various sizes, without any one political unit
being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of the state. And
their political allegiances and loyalties should be widely dispersed over
these units: neighborhood, town, county, province, state, region, and world
at large. People should be politically at home in all of them, without
converging upon any one of them as the lodestar of their political
identity.21
Pogge promises to develop this proposal but never does, instead limply admitting
that “nothing definite can be said about the ideal number of levels or the exact
distribution of legislative, executive, and judicial functions over them.”22 Pogge
also argues that various international institutions should be set up that would have
the power to ensure that only democratic governments would be able to issue
sovereign debt, and not authoritarian governments. Democratic governments
would pass constitutional amendments that prohibit future unconstitutional
governments from borrowing; in case of dispute about whether a future
government is unconstitutional, the matter would be referred to an independent
Democracy Panel acting under the auspices of the UN; and, lest creditors be
unwilling to lend to democracies because they fear that future unconstitutional
governments will renege on debts if they cannot borrow more, an International
20
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Democratic Loan Guarantee Fund would ensure that outstanding debt is serviced
until a democratic government is reestablished.23
Fernando Tesón takes the simplest view; he argues that international law
should permit unilateral humanitarian intervention.24 If such a norm existed, then
states would be more willing to intervene in order to stop atrocities in other states.
Tesón does not believe that the pretext problem is severe. All of international law
is vulnerable to pretext and yet it functions adequately because states that violate
international law under a pretext risk being deemed lawbreakers by other states.
Why do Barry, Singer, Buchanan, Pogge, and Tesón come to such
different conclusions, even though their normative premises are largely similar?
All of them reject the old fashioned view that the borders of a state are sacrosanct;
all agree that human rights violations in one country ought to concern people
living in others; and all of them acknowledge that the use of military force in
order to stop atrocities may be justified.
The divergence in their positions is due to unstated institutional
assumptions. Buchanan and (probably) Tesón do not believe that the United
Nations can be reformed, so as to be more democratic or more likely to authorize
humanitarian interventions, but Buchanan thinks that the Europeans would take
up the slack. Barry thinks that a world government is possible or, if not, an
international legal system that takes precedence over national laws (unlike the
current system). Singer does not think that a world government is possible but
does think that radical reform of the UN is. Pogge thinks that a world government
would be inferior to his regime of overlapping jurisdictions.25
There are good reasons for doubting the more institutionally ambitious
claims. A world government is not a realistic possibility, and Barry does not
explain how an international legal system would be possible without a world

23
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government to create and enforce it.26 Singer’s proposal requires amendment of
the UN charter, but amendment requires a supermajority in both the General
Assembly and the Security Council, and can be vetoed by the permanent
members.27 Singer assumes that states like China (which has the veto), Nigeria,
and Iran would acquiesce in a system under which they must either give their
citizens a vote (which they would not do) or else enjoy voting power equivalent
to, or less than, that of Nauru (population 13,000) or Iceland (population
300,000). In Singer’s system, if India, a democracy, permitted its citizens to vote
for UN delegates, it would have the voting power of more than 100 other
countries; yet most of these countries would also have to acquiesce in Singer’s
reform proposal even though they know that their voting power would be
swamped by that of a single state.28 Buchanan imagines that the Europeans would
take on the burden of humanitarian intervention, even though no European
country has shown the slightest interest in humanitarian intervention in the past
(with the ambiguous exception of the Kosovo intervention, which was largely the
work of the United States), nor any inclination, as he notes, of shouldering the
cost of an effective military.29 He also imagines that, American obstructionism
aside, states like China and Russia would not have any objection to the European
force, even though both countries, which routinely violate the human rights of
internal minorities, have made their skepticism about humanitarian intervention
clear in the recent past. Pogge cavalierly dismisses the concern that must be in
every reader’s mind – that his proposal is a recipe for chaos – by observing that in
modern federalist states like the United States, the location of ultimate authority is
often confusing and vague. But the identification of ultimate authority does matter
– it matters, for example, whether the Arkansas national guard obeys President
Eisenhower or Orval Faubus, just as it matters whether Yugoslav army units obey
President Milošević of Serbia or President Tudjman of Croatia. The reason that
such conflicts do not happen more often in countries like the United States is that
26

Barry acknowledges the existence of “institutional constraints” (Barry, supra at 40) but does not
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27
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Veto Power, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2005, at sec. 1, p.14 (describing disagreement over the
distribution of vetoes).
29
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11

lines of authority, while not always clearly described in constitutional documents,
are well understood and enjoy consensus.
Lack of attention to institutional problems does not only explain the
disagreements among these theorists; it also leads to internal inconsistencies. In a
discussion of secession, Barry says:
If the breakup of an existing state would make the maintenance of liberal
institutions easier (or at least no less likely) and is desired by those in the
area (without any division about its desirability between different groups
within it), there is no reason for a cosmopolitan to oppose it.30
Note the tension between this claim and the argument in favor of a world
government or international legal system that takes precedence over national law.
Barry’s argument implicitly travels in a circle: a world government is needed to
solve global problems like climate warming; but a world government might
mistreat regions or sections; so these regions or sections must have the right to
secede; but then they might secede so as to avoid the world government’s climate
control laws; and we are back to our interstate system that cannot solve the global
warming problem. It is hard to see how one could both support a world
government and an expansive right to secede. There might be some way to
resolve this tension, but Barry does not tell us what it is. Pogge similarly approves
international rules that would encourage separatist movements that would break
up states31 while assuming that the resulting centrifugal forces would not affect
the large liberal democracies on which he depends to enforce other elements of
his ambitious program.32
Only Tesón’s argument seems plausible. Although most countries support
the status quo, some states, such as Britain and possibly the United States, support
a rule permitting humanitarian intervention.33 Such a rule was endorsed in a
recent UN report on reform of the UN, although that report envisioned a
continuing requirement of Security Council authorization.34 In addition, Tesón
can point to precedents – that is, unilateral or coalition-led humanitarian
30

See Barry, supra at 56.
See Pogge, supra at 190-91.
32
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33
See Straw: War Won't Change UN Charter, Press Ass’n, Mar. 30, 2004, available at http://
politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1182177,00.html.
34
Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human
Rights
for
All
paras.
125-26
(2005),
available
at
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm.
31

12

interventions that did not meet substantial world opposition, including
interventions in Cambodia by Vietnam, Uganda by Tanzania, and Kosovo by
NATO – that bolster his claim that a rule permitting humanitarian intervention is
sustainable as international law.35 The upshot is that although the status quo may
prevail, a moderate revision of the law is possible.
What makes Tesón’s argument seem more realistic than the others? In
part, the answer is that Tesón’s argument depends on a well understood
mechanism of international legal reform – the development of customary
international law – and it draws on empirical evidence about the attitudes and
practices of states. But this answer is partial and unsatisfactory. What is needed is
a more general framework for evaluating the realism of proposals for international
legal reform, where “realism” refers to their consistency with what we know
about human psychology and the problems of institutional design.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
There has long been the view that international law should advance global
justice, not merely serve the interests of states, but this view is in tension with the
traditional basis of international law – the consent of states. Nonetheless,
improvement of international law through reform is surely possible. The question
is how to distinguish reform proposals that are possible and reform proposals that
are not possible. To do that, one needs a theory that explains the institutional
constraints on international lawmaking.
In this Part, I discuss my assumptions. I make one normative and three
positive assumptions. The normative assumption is that the goal of international
legal reform should be to maximize global welfare. The positive assumptions are
that (1) the preferences of the world population are heterogeneous; (2)
governments try to maximize the welfare of their citizens or a subpopulation of
their citizens (elites, government supporters), and ignore the welfare of
noncitizens; and (3) international legal organization and enforcement are
constrained by the collective action problem.
A. Welfarism
Welfarism is the theory that an action is good if it maximizes the welfare
of relevant individuals; global welfarism is the theory that all individuals, rather

35
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than the members of a particular group or society, are counted in the social
welfare function. The welfare of all individuals counts equally.
Welfarism is a version of consequentialism – the idea that the goodness of
actions depends on their consequences rather than their intrinsic nature. By
contrast, deontologists believe that individuals have certain duties that are not
exhausted by their consequences; for example, one must tell the truth in cases
where truth telling reduces welfare rather than increases it.
There are many different theories of welfare. Economists generally
assume that a person’s welfare is a function of preference satisfaction. The best
way to enhance a person’s welfare is by giving her what she prefers – or, better
yet, money, which she can use to buy what she wants. Philosophers reject this
view and offer various alternatives. Some philosophers agree that a person’s
welfare increases when his preferences or desires are satisfied but further stipulate
that only certain preferences or desires (informed, non-distorted, etc.) count.
Others argue that welfare is a function of mental states: a person’s welfare
increases when he has the mental state that corresponds to happiness or other
positive feeling. Still others argue that welfare increases when a person acquires
certain objective goods – health, friendship, education – regardless of whether he
or she wants these goods or these goods provide him or her with a positive mental
state.36 I do not express a view about which of these versions of welfarism is
correct; my argument is compatible with all of them, within reasonable limits.
Why should international law reform be based on global welfarism? The
main reason is that nearly everyone agrees that the welfare of human beings is, at
least, a relevant consideration for governments. Authoritarian governments,
theological governments, and liberal governments all agree that they should be
concerned about improving the well being of their citizens, even if they agree on
little else. Because international law is based on the consent of states, it can reflect
only their areas of agreement, and not their areas of disagreement. Thus, welfarist
premises are an attractive starting point for understanding and evaluating
international law.
There are two plausible alternatives to the welfarist approach. The first
view is that the purpose of international law is to advance the interests of states,
not the people who live in them. After all, international law is based on the
consent of states, and states will not consent to international law reform that does
not advance their interests. This view is an old one and implicit in much
36

For a discussion, see James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral
Importance (1986).
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traditional scholarship, but it confuses normative and positive.37 States themselves
are not moral agents; state interests are just constructs based on the interests and
values of people living within states. Modern moral theories agree that the
relevant moral agents are people, not nations or other collectivities. To make an
argument based on political morality, one must appeal to the values and interests
of people, not collectivities.38
The second view is that international law should advance human rights or
democratic institutions. This view is consistent with the consensus assumption
that individuals, not groups, matter, but it rejects welfarism in favor of a social
contract or rights-based perspective.39 Although I have doubts about this position,
my purpose is not to criticize it. As I noted above, most contractarians such as
Rawls agree that governments should concern themselves with the public’s
welfare. The argument in this paper focuses on institutional constraints on
international law reform, and it will generally not matter, for purposes of the
argument, whether the constraints limit reform for welfarist purposes or reform
for the sake of vindicating human rights. In many cases, one might, without
affecting the argument, replace “welfare” with “welfare subject to human rights
constraints,” as the maximand. So although I will assume that welfarism is the
right criterion for evaluating reform, the assumption is mainly for expository
convenience, and the argument would, for the most part, remain unaltered if I
focused on human rights instead.40
B. Heterogeneous Preferences and the State System
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See Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society 307 (1995) (defending the state system); Louis Henkin,
How Nations Behave 337-39 (1979) (defending international law).
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See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1979). This is the
overwhelming consensus in moral theory; even authors who take seriously nationalism and the
nation state base their views on the importance of collectivities for the well being or dignity of
individuals. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999); Michael Walzer, The Moral
Standing of States, supra (defending his views against the charge of statism); David Miller, On
Nationality (1995). For a survey and critique of nationalist theories such as Miller’s, see Barry,
supra. For a slightly dated discussion of the literature on “communitarian” versus “cosmopolitan”
approaches to international relations, see Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New
Normative Approaches (1992).
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265-87 (1995) (discussing responsibilities toward fellow citizens versus foreigners).
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A state is a political entity that joins a territory and a population. People
on the territory are in the state, and subject to its jurisdiction. The state acts
through a government, which may change over time, even as the state itself
remains constant. The government typically has a monopoly on force within the
territory of the state.
Because the government of a state has a monopoly on force, it can provide
public goods to its citizens. It finances the public goods by taxing citizens, and it
prevents foreigners from free riding by controlling its borders. The standard list of
public goods includes security, environmental quality, the provision of market
institutions, education, and social insurance. The larger the state, the more
cheaply it can provide public goods, as it can spread the cost over a larger
population.
Why, then, is there not a single world state? A world state would be able
to spread the fixed costs of public goods over the largest possible population, and
thus supply them more cheaply than any smaller state. There is no reason in
principle why a world state cannot exist, but history suggests that the problem is
that as the territory controlled by a government increases in size, the government
experiences increasing difficulty providing public goods to the increasingly
diverse people within the territory. People in remote areas realize that they can
improve their well being by separating from the existing state and either starting a
new state or joining a neighbor. The government is not wealthy enough to bribe
them to stay, or powerful enough to prevent them from leaving. Thus, the
fundamental reason for the existence of multiple states is the heterogeneity of
preferences (defined broadly to include interests, values, and so forth).
The world is divided among a large number of states. The governments of
the states recognize, for the most part, the existence of all the other states. This
means that each government has absolute or nearly absolute power to govern
people on its territory, and also that each government acknowledges that it has no
power to govern people on the territory of other states. This is generally what is
meant by “sovereignty.”41 There are some limits on sovereignty. Most important,
in principle all UN members except veto holders could find themselves legally
obliged to obey a Security Council resolution that restricts their control of their
territory, but this restriction is more formal than real because the vetoholders
rarely agree and most non-vetoholders can claim one of the vetoholders as a
41

There is an enormous literature on this topic. See, e.g., Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty (1999);
John J. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdate Concept, 97 Amer. J. Inter.
L. 782 (2003). The word is used in many ways, often inconsistently; however, the core meaning I
identify is, I think, uncontroversial.
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patron.42 European nations have yielded some sovereignty to the European Union,
but this sharing of sovereignty provides no other states with authority over the
European nations. And although all states are subject to treaty obligations, the
populations of those states retain the formal and real power to direct their
governments to violate the treaties, and so in this respect treaty obligations are
consistent with the existence of sovereignty. Sovereignty is based on the beliefs
and attitudes of populations, and cannot be lost or given away unless the relevant
population acquiesces.
A few more assumptions should be mentioned. First, preferences cluster in
a territorial fashion: people who live in France are more similar to each other than
they are to people who live in Germany or Indonesia. Second, the clustering of
preferences cannot be easily changed by policy. Although states try to instill
uniformity through education, propaganda, and so forth, there are limits to what
they can do. Third, it is not practicable to have different governments providing
different public goods at different levels unless there is a single hierarchical
authority that can resolve disputes.43
A state exists only as long as its government can maintain control of
people on its territory and prevent other states from encroaching. A state ceases to
exist when it is annexed by another state; this can happen simply because the
original state’s population prefers to be a part of the larger state. States can also
divide as a result of secessionist movements, and new states come into existence
when separatists establish control over a territory, exclude the government of the
original state, and manage to obtain the recognition of other states.
C. Agency Costs and Governments
1. Perfect Government
Governments determine how the state’s power is used to regulate people.
It is useful to consider first an “ideal” government which, I will assume, is a
perfect agent for the citizens of the state. Such a government chooses policies that
maximize the welfare of its own citizens but ignores the welfare of citizens of
42

See Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After Kosovo
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The reason for this is that there are great economies of scope in government; see Alesina and
Spolaore, supra, at 27. If this assumption is abandoned, then conceivably various overlapping
jurisdictions would be possible. See Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, The New Democratic
Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (2004) (proposing a
scheme of voluntary, overlapping jurisdictions).
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other states. Typically, this means that the government creates public goods –
including defense, internal security against crime, environmental protection,
enforcement of property and contract rights, and so forth – and redistributes
wealth. These sorts of policies benefit the government’s citizens, but this
framework does not exclude the possibility that the citizens of one state care
about the well being of citizens of another state. If this is the case, the perfect
government of the first state will choose policies that benefit the citizens of the
other state. But in any event the government does not choose policies that are
globally welfare maximizing.44
This point is worth emphasizing, as many of my conclusions will follow
from it. To see its importance, imagine a hypothetical perfect world government
that does choose policies that maximize global welfare. Such a government would
transfer a great deal of wealth from rich people living in North America,
Australia, Japan, and Europe to poor people living in Africa, South Asia, and
South America. It would also adopt policies that create global public goods such
as control of the world climate – even if the optimal policies have asymmetric
distributive impacts – for example, reducing the welfare of people in some richer
areas a little while increasing the welfare of people in other poorer areas a lot.
Now imagine that the world consists of n states whose governments
maximize domestic welfare. It is clear that the governments of wealthy states will
not consent to massive redistribution of wealth to poor states, though they may
agree to provide moderate aid in order to satisfy any altruistic impulses of their
citizens. It is also clear that the governments will agree to climate change policies
only if they enhance the welfare of all states. Thus, the state system creates an
implicit Pareto criterion: world policies, reflected in international law, will exist
only when they make all states better off. The policies that satisfy the Pareto
criterion will be a subset of the policies that are welfare-maximizing because all
welfare-maximizing policies with strong distributive impacts (that is, they make
the population in at least one state worse off) will be excluded. Thus, international
law will supply fewer public goods than would a hypothetical ideal world
government.
2. Imperfect Government
Compounding this problem, all governments are imperfect to varying
degrees. The officials and bureaucrats who operate governments may choose to
maximize the welfare of themselves, their friends and relatives, their tribes or
44
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ethnic groups, the inhabitants of certain regions, and other groups that are a subset
of the entire population. At one extreme, a dictator may take account of only his
own welfare or that of his family. At the other extreme, a well functioning
democracy will take account of the general population of voters, or the majority,
or various groups or interest groups. The difference is one of degree, though often
very great.
For simplicity, we will imagine two types of states: dictatorships and
democracies. Dictatorships maximize the welfare of a few individuals or a small
group, albeit subject to a constraint – if they provide too few resources to (or
extract too much from) the general population, it will revolt.45 The government of
a democracy, we suppose, maximizes the welfare of the median voter. I will
assume, roughly, that the world at all times consists of a mix of dictatorships and
democracies.46
Note that maximization of the welfare of the median voter is not the same
as domestic welfare maximization: it is consistent, for example, with transferring
wealth from a poor minority to a wealthy majority, which would not generally
enhance welfare because of the diminishing marginal utility of the dollar.
D. The Collective Action Problem and Enforcement
Because no world government exists that could enforce international law,
international law can be sustained only if states enforce it in a decentralized
fashion. But decentralized enforcement is highly problematic, and can be effective
in only limited circumstances.47
To see why, imagine that state X violates international law by sending
military forces across the border with state Y. Suppose that state Y is too weak to
resist the military incursion; what is its recourse? It cannot file a complaint with
an international prosecutor, or bring a lawsuit in an international court (or if it can
do the latter, it has no way to enforce the court’s judgment). It can complain to
other states that state X violates international law, but it has no way to compel
these other states to take action.
In an ideal world, other states – the international community – would
sanction state X. Sanctions could include cutting off trade, suspending
international cooperation, and even military intervention. Unfortunately, the
45
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international community has weak incentives to impose sanctions on state X. The
problem is that sanctioning is costly for the other states of the world. If a state Z
cuts off trade with state X, then Z suffers from the lack of trade just as X does. If
state Z participates in an invasion, then Z’s soldiers are at risk. Further, Z might
have close and valuable relations with X while having no relationship with state
Y; in such a case, Z would gain very little from cooperating in imposing sanctions
while losing a great deal. Finally, Z might rationally do nothing in the hope that
other states will act: this free rider problem will undermine the incentives of all
states even if they have an interest in maintaining international borders in general
or Y’s borders in particular. For all these reasons, effective international
economic and international sanctioning has been extremely rare.48
International law is sustained chiefly though self-help, not collective
action. Victims of illegal behavior retaliate against the violator; to avoid such
retaliation, states comply with international law as much as they can. For
example, when the United States violates WTO rules in a way that injures the
European Union, only the EU retaliates; Japan does not.49 When states invade
each other, the victim fights back, occasionally with a few allies; except in rare
cases, the rest of the world does not intervene. When states harass foreign
diplomats, the diplomats’ state threatens retaliation; the rest of the world does
not.50 Enforcement of international law is in this way mainly a bilateral
phenomenon – a matter between violators and victims – and not a multilateral
phenomenon.
These enforcement problems have two implications for international law.
First, most of international law reflects the bilateral nature of enforcement. For
example, even though the trade regime is a multilateral system, in the sense that
the rules apply to all members, the regime provides that only the victim of trade
violations have a right to retaliate, even though the system as a whole would be
more effective if all states could agree to retaliate against violators, and follow
48
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through on this agreement.51 But states do not make such an agreement because
they understand that the free rider problem would undermine it.
Second, international law that, explicitly or implicitly, depends on (largenumber) multilateral enforcement is usually ineffective. Human rights treaties
cannot be enforced through self-help because human rights abuses of state X
against its own citizens do not injure any particular other state, but the
international community at large, to the extent that the international community
cares about human rights. With no particular victim to threaten retaliation, most
states ignore the human rights regime.
The strength of international law enforcement is an empirical question,
and a great deal of controversy surrounds this question. Most international law
professors believe that enforcement of international law is strong because states
do not want to be seen as scofflaws.52 The empirical literature provides little
support for this view. The UN charter’s ban on the use of military force is
frequently violated;53 international humanitarian law is selectively invoked;54 and
human rights treaties are generally ignored.55 These are all multilateral treaties; by
contrast, bilateral treaties seem to have a better record.56 However, I will avoid
taking a strong position on this issue in this paper, and will vary my assumptions
– sometimes assuming that enforcement is strong, and sometimes assuming that
enforcement is limited.57
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E. Summary
The world population will not subject itself to a single government
because preferences are heterogeneous. Instead, multiple states exist. Because of
agency costs, all of these states have imperfect governments and many of them
have extremely bad governments. Nonetheless, governments recognize that they
can improve the well being of their citizens (or a subset of their citizens such as
the elite) by cooperating with other governments. This joint recognition provides
the mechanism that furthers welfare maximization, much as in standard analysis
of domestic markets and international trade. States have an interest in supporting
international law that allows them to increase the well being of their citizens. But
the collective action problem ensures that the amount of cooperation falls short of
the ideal, which is the amount that would exist if the world were governed by an
ideal world state.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This Part draws out the implications from the assumptions described in
Part I. For expository convenience, I will analyze each of a series of international
legal topics in the following way. First, I assume that governments are perfect and
enforcement is perfect. Second, I assume that governments are imperfect and
enforcement is perfect. Third, I assume that governments are imperfect and
enforcement is imperfect. Finally, I briefly examine the law, history, and other
relevant evidence. The moral of the story in each case is that even when
institutions are strong (governments are perfect, enforcement is perfect), the
structure of the state system places significant limits on the usefulness of
international law. When more realistic assumptions are made about institutions,
then the value of international law is even more limited.
A. State Size; Secession; Merger

one hand, the population within a state is less diverse, but on the other hand it is far more
numerous than the population of states. Whatever the answer to this puzzle – and no doubt the
collective action problem is always a matter of degree – it does not matter for my analysis because
interstate cooperation assumes intrastate cooperation. That is, if a state’s policies are weak or
inconsistent because the internal collective action problem is not overcome, the global effort to
adopt policies that aggregate this state’s interest with that of other states will be limited by the
weakness of the state’s interest. For example, a treaty that adequately reduces global warming is
not possible, even if the interstate collective action problem is fully resolved, if one or more state
parties to the treaty are unable to aggregate and represent their own citizens’ interests in climate
control.
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The state system does not have particular implications about the number
or size of states. Indeed, the number and size of states have changed greatly over
the years. Roughly 80 states existed in 1870; 60 in 1900; 80 in 1950; 170 in 1980;
and 190 today.58 In this Part, I examine the implications of my assumptions for
state size and number, and the law of secession and recognition.
1. Perfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
An important implication of the assumption that governments are perfect
agents – and not an additional assumption that is separate from it – is that states
have the optimal size and shape. As this point is important, and has rarely
attracted any comment in the philosophy or international law literatures, I will
spend some time explaining what I mean.
Suppose there are two bordering, self-governing territories, X and Y.59
Each territory is identical in size, resources, and population, including the number
of people and the distribution of their preferences. Each government supplies a
single public good – for concreteness, let us call it “criminal justice.”
Each individual’s utility is a function of income (from ordinary market
activity) and the public good, minus a tax payment. People’s preferences for the
public good are heterogeneous, meaning that some people value it a lot and some
people value it very little. The tax is the same for everyone, and is used to fund
the public good. Thus, people who attach a high value to the public good are net
winners, and people who attach a low value to the public good are net losers.
Public goods are characterized by high fixed costs. To understand what
this means, suppose that it costs one of the governments $100 to set up the
criminal justice system (build the police stations and courthouses, etc.), and then
another $1 per member of the population (the more people there are, the more
police are needed). If the population is 50, then the total cost is $150, and each
person must pay a tax of $3. If the population is 100, then the total cost is $200,
and each person must pay a tax of $2. If the population is 1000, then the total cost
is $1100, and each person must pay $1.10. Economists refer to this characteristic
as “economies of scale”: supplying a public good is cheaper per person, the larger
the population.
If criminal justice is a public good, and all else is equal, then the states X
and Y can achieve economies of scale by merging, and thus merging their
58
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criminal justice systems. If each state has a population of 50, then – as the
numerical example above shows – each citizen saves $1 when the states are
merged. Economies of scale, then, are a reason why states should merge and
become larger. If economies of scale were all that mattered, then a single world
state would be optimal.
However, as noted above, people have heterogeneous preferences.
Suppose some people don’t want or need criminal justice protection, or don’t
value it much, because they live in remote areas and don’t fear criminal predation.
Other people do value criminal justice because they live in congested cities where
crime would be rampant if not deterred by the police. To simplify, suppose that
the first type of person values the criminal justice system at $1.50 and the second
type of person values it at $5.00. Further, suppose that initially the low-valuation
type of person lives in state X, and the high-valuation type of person lives in state
Y.
If the states do not merge, then clearly X will supply a lower level of
criminal justice than state Y will. Indeed, in our stylized example, the state will
supply zero criminal justice because the costs ($3 per person) exceed the benefits
($1.50 per person). (More realistically, X will invest in fewer courthouses and
police stations, and generate less criminal justice, rather than zero.) Meanwhile, Y
will supply the public good because the cost ($3 per person) is less than the
benefit ($5 per person). Finally, note that if the states merged and supplied the
public good based on a $2.00 tax, then each person in X would lose $0.50
compared to the status quo (where they lost 0), and each person in Y would gain
$1 relative to the status quo (where they gained $2 rather than $3).
This last point suggests that merger could occur as long as a transfer could
be arranged – or, what is the same thing, a variable tax is used. Let people living
in X pay a tax of $1.25 and the people living in Y pay a tax of $2.75. Now the
people in X gain $0.25 from the merger, and the people in Y gain $0.25 from the
merger.
But transfers are not costless. They involve administrative costs and cause
economic distortions. Thus, the merger will not occur if the costs associated with
the transfer (which are themselves an increasing function of the degree of
heterogeneity) exceed the gains from exploiting economies of scale. This will
sometimes be the case, but not always.
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To sum up, the size of a state is a function of scale economies and
heterogeneity costs. As scale economies increase relative to heterogeneity costs,
the optimal size of the state increases as well.60
How does this conclusion follow from the assumption that governments
are perfect agents? If governments are perfect agents, then they will agree to
divide their own state, or merge it with other states or parts of other states, when
doing so maximizes the welfare of their own citizens, even if the governments
themselves go out of business. Thus, if scale economies are achieved through a
merger, then the states involved will merge. If, in light of heterogeneity of
preferences, states should divide, then they will and secession will be regarded as
unproblematic. This is obviously unrealistic, but the question is why it is
unrealistic, a question that I will address subsequently.
2. Imperfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
a. Democracies
Democracies maximize the welfare of the median voter, not of the entire
domestic population; therefore, democratic governments are imperfect. As a result
of this imperfection, states will tend to be too small, as shown by Alesina and
Spolaore.61
The logic is as follows. Imagine a single state that generates a public good
like criminal justice. The population is heterogeneous, so not everyone benefits
from the public good to the same degree (transfers are impossible or costly).
Because the government maximizes the welfare of the median voter, it chooses
the type and level of public good that the median voter prefers. This means that
the minority might not receive much of a benefit from the public good, and could
even be harmed, because the taxation needed to fund the public good could
exceed the benefits members of the minority receive.
Suppose now that the minority lives in a border region, and can secede if a
majority of the minority votes in favor of secession. The minority might prefer to
secede rather than contribute to the public good that it does not benefit from. The
advantage of secession is that the minority can set up its own government that will
supply the type and level of public good that the minority most prefers. The
disadvantage of secession is that the cost of financing cannot be spread across as
60
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many people. Still, in imaginable cases the minority will be better off with its own
state, and the majority will – because of the cost of transfers – be unable to bribe
the minority to remain part of the original state, even though aggregate welfare
would be maximized in a single state
The driving force of the analysis is that neither the majority nor the
minority have the right incentives to choose optimal policy. The majority
externalizes costs imposed on the minority; the minority, if it has the power to
secede, ignores the costs imposed on the majority. As a result, there are too many
states, and states are too small. Secession is now morally problematic.
b. Dictatorships
The opposite is the case for dictatorships. Dictators are assumed to want to
maximize revenue subject to an insurrection constraint – if citizens fall below a
threshold level of welfare, they will revolt, which is more costly for the dictator
than providing them with the threshold level of welfare. If the insurrection
constraint is low enough, dictators maximize their own welfare by controlling as
large a population as possible: the larger the population, the greater the source of
revenue for the dictator’s coffers.
One implication of this view is that dictators will exploit their citizens not
by failing to finance public goods but by taxing them. Aside from the level of
taxation, and the rules that dictatorships need to stay in power such as restrictions
on political opposition, democracies and dictators should choose the same
policies.62 It follows that dictatorships and democracies will agree to similar kinds
of international law – such as climate control pacts and trade agreements. Thus,
there is reason to think that international law will not differentiate between
democracies and dictatorships – at least for certain types of policies. We will
return to this topic later.
c. Implications
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For the global welfarist, imperfect government creates two sources of
concern. First, imperfect governments choose domestic policies that do not
necessarily maximize the welfare of their own citizens. Second, imperfect
governments choose or acquiesce in state size that does not necessarily maximize
the welfare of their own citizens. Can international law solve these problems?
The difficulty here is that for international law to solve these problems,
governments which by hypothesis are imperfect must agree to international law
that restricts their behavior. Is this possible? To keep the analysis concrete, I
consider an important albeit sporadic issue of international law: the circumstances
under which states should recognize a secessionist movement as having
established a new state.
All governments are democracies. Suppose at time 1 that all states have
the optimal size and shape. At time 2, minorities within states may choose to
secede and establish their own states. At time 3, other states choose whether to
recognize the existence of the new state. If they do, they trade and cooperate with
the successor state to the same extent that they trade and cooperate with other
states. If they do not, they refuse to trade or cooperate with the successor state, in
which case the welfare of the citizens of the successor state falls drastically.
We can imagine a welfare-maximizing recognition law.63 States would
have the obligation to recognize successor states if and only if the joint welfare of
citizens of the original and successor states exceeds the joint welfare of those
citizens if no secession occurred. As a practical matter, the judgment would
depend on the degree of heterogeneity of citizens and scale economies. If the
members of the successor state are religiously, linguistically, ethnically, and
culturally very different from the members of the rump state, then recognition
would be more likely. If the division of the states would deprive citizens of
important public goods – like a large internal market – then recognition would be
less likely. In sum, by withholding recognition of precipitate secessions, states
could in theory enhance global welfare.
All governments are dictatorships. A similar analysis would apply in the
all-dictatorship case. States would have the obligation to recognize secessions
only when they are welfare-maximizing for citizens of the successor state and the
original state. Because the territory of dictatorships tends to be too large in the
63

I am referring to the law governing the recognition of states, not governments. See Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law sec. 201 (rules on recognition of states). The assumption in
the text is that states would refuse to cooperate with states that they do not recognize; the reality is
more complicated.

27

first place, the optimal recognition rule might well require foreign states to
recognize separatist movements more quickly if they separate from dictatorships
than if they separate from democracies. To see why, recall that dictators allow all
citizens (except a small group of supporters) only enough welfare to prevent
insurrections. A separatist group will secede as long as it receives more than that.
As for the citizens of the rump, they will be made no worse off, as the dictator
will continue providing them with the minimum amount. Thus, the dictator
himself will suffer the loss from secession.
A mix of democracies and dictatorships. The comments above indicate
that optimal recognition law would generally require states to recognize
secessions from dictatorships, but to recognize secessions from democracies only
when the population is sufficiently heterogeneous and scale economies are
sufficiently low.
3. Imperfect Governments; Imperfect Enforcement
Imperfect enforcement occurs because governments may not gain
anything from enforcing international law. The best case for enforcement occurs
when two states are engaged in bilateral cooperation. If one state violates a treaty,
the other state will likely retaliate. When the law benefits all or many states, and
one state violates the law, the incentive of any other state to retaliate may be
minimal. This is the familiar problem of collective action, as it applies to
international cooperation.
The best case for enforcement of globally welfare maximizing recognition
law would occur in the two-state case. Imagine two bordering states, each of
which is a democracy and each of which has a separatist movement. One could
imagine the following deal between the two states: each state promises not to
recognize a separatist movement in the other state. If this promise is made public,
then the incentive to secede may be substantially reduced: a new state that is not
recognized as such by other states, which refuse to cooperate with it, is not likely
to be viable. Separatists would do better by working for political reform within
the structure of the existing state.
The deal is not necessarily welfare-maximizing, however. After all, the
median voter in each state (in effect) agrees to the deal, and, by hypothesis, the
median voter does not take account of the interests of the minority. For the rule to
be jointly welfare maximizing, it would be necessary, at the time the deal is made,
for the median voter not to know whether he or she is likely to want to secede or
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to prevent secession.64 This, of course, is highly unlikely; and unlikely to be
sustainable in any event.
But the broader problem is that such two-state deals are unlikely to deter
secession. The reason is that the separatist movement can seek recognition and
cooperation from the rest of the world. If the two original states in question refuse
to cooperate with the successor state, this just means that the opportunities for
cooperation are that much greater for other states. For example, if the successor
state has unexploited mineral resources, the rest of the world will be eager to
cooperate with it, so that foreign companies will be able to exploit the resources.
The collective action problem thus suggests that enforcement will be weak or
nonexistent.
4. Evidence: Law and History
In principle, recognition law could be used to maximize global welfare.
States would have an obligation to recognize separatist movements quickly if they
claim secession from dictatorships, and to recognize separatist movements slowly
and reluctantly if they claim secession from democracies.65 It is unlikely,
however, that states have the right incentives to do so. Dictatorships have no
particular interest in aiding democracies, and democracies could implement the
optimal rule only if they could overcome severe collective action problems. For
this reason, it is not surprising that international law does not generally oblige
states to recognize or refuse to recognize new states (except to the extent limited
by the principle of sovereignty).66 Nonetheless, the principles and tradeoffs I have
been discussing have important historical precedents.
Governments have long recognized that secession can be both desirable
and problematic. The principle of self-determination advanced by President
Wilson recognized that national borders during World War I were not necessarily
just – in our terms, welfare maximizing. Wilson believed that ethnically
homogenous populations should have the right to break off from existing imperial
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structures and establish their own states.67 In tension with the principle of selfdetermination, states have long acknowledged that they should not encourage
separatist movements in foreign states – this follows from the principle of
sovereignty.68 When secessions nonetheless occur, the law is simply that states
may do whatever they want: they may recognize the new state, or not, however it
might serve their interest. There have been occasional efforts to advance a new
principle that new states will be recognized only if they respect human rights and
are democratic, but this principle does not have many adherents.69
The principle of self-determination reflects the idea that homogenous
populations are, all else equal, easier to govern than heterogeneous populations;
thus, states should tend to be homogenous. The principle of sovereignty reflects
the idea that every state is subject to centrifugal forces that may reduce rather than
enhance welfare; it thus may be best for other states not to encourage separatism
within a given state. The efforts to condition recognition on democracy and
human rights reflect the idea that people living in dictatorships are worse off than
people living in democracies. But the failure to embody these ideas in workable
international law reflects the problem of collective action. Bilateral processes
cannot, except in unusual circumstances, be used to implement these ideas. They
can prevail only if all or nearly all states agree to enforce them – for a separatist
movement needs only a few cooperative partners in order to be self-sustaining.
But because of free riding, such a legal system has not come into existence.70
B. Sovereignty
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68
See Lawrence M. Frankel, International Law of Secession: New Rules for New Era, 14 Hous. J.
Int’l L. 521, 535-37 (1992)
69
See Lori F. Damrosch et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 258-61 (4th ed. 2001)
(describing diplomatic efforts to make adherence to democratic principles and human rights a
condition of statehood).
70
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free migration: individuals will sort themselves into groups with similar preferences, reducing the
cost of distributing the gains from government action. On the other hand, individuals fleeing
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The concept of sovereignty arose briefly in the discussion of secession,
above, but it has more general importance. In this Part, I explore the ways in
which sovereignty reflects an institutionally constrained globally welfare
maximizing conception of international law.
As noted above, sovereignty is an ambiguous concept, but it is generally
understood to mean the right of a state to be free from interference from other
states, and the corresponding duty not to interfere with the governance of other
states.71 A clear example of a violation of sovereignty is a military invasion, in
which one state’s military forces enter the territory of another state without that
other state’s consent. Flying through the airspace of another state, or sending
ships through its territorial waters, without its consent, is also a violation of
sovereignty. There are many more ambiguous examples, such as using the radio
to propagandize across borders or, as noted above, providing aid or
encouragement to separatist movements.
1. Perfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
If governments are perfect, then states will have the optimal size, and
optimal policies will be chosen within their borders. In particular, governments
will tax citizens and use the money to produce public goods that benefit all their
citizens.
Governments will, however, have a strong incentive both to externalize
costs on other states, and to free ride on the public good production of other
states. As an example of the first, a perfect domestic welfare-maximizing
government would locate industrial zones upwind from borders, so that the
pollution will harm foreigners rather than citizens. As an example of the second,
such a government might encourage its citizens to travel to other states in order to
acquire technological knowledge generated by foreign states’ investment in
research.
One way to understand the concept of sovereignty is as a recognition of
the central role of the state in producing public goods. Public goods cannot be
efficiently produced unless states can control who pays for them and who benefits
from them. A sovereign state has the formal legal right to object if another state
either externalizes costs across its borders or, by encouraging its citizens or
otherwise, free rides on the first state’s production of collective goods.
Sovereignty allows the victim state in the first case to demand that the pollution
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be reduced, and the victim state in the second case to close its borders to the
citizens of the free riding government.
2. Imperfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
As many commentators have noted, however, sovereignty also allows
governments to abuse their own citizens. Suppose that state X persecutes
members of a religious minority. People in state Y object. Under the principle of
sovereignty, state Y would not be able to send an army to state X in order to
protect the religious minority. Thus, many people have argued that sovereignty
should yield in certain circumstances – for example, when a government commits
atrocities against its own citizens.
The problem with this view is that it is in tension with the assumption for
having a state system (as opposed to a world government) in the first place – that
people living in a particular territory are better off if they have their own
government than if they are a small part of a world state. Recall that the rationale
here is that given the heterogeneity of the world population, public goods are
created more efficiently at a national level than at a global level. The supposition
that state Y’s government will act in the interest of people living in state X by
protecting them against X’s government violates the assumption that states should
be separate.
We can avoid this problem by assuming that people in state Y have an
altruistic interest in the well being of people living in state X or, more generally,
that altruistic concerns transcend national borders. If this assumption is correct,
then there exists a global public good – all people having greater than a minimum
level of well being. States would rationally agree to a treaty regime that creates
this public good, and indeed the human rights regime could be interpreted in this
fashion. Such a theory would not necessarily justify humanitarian intervention,
but it would justify some kind of sanctioning system that would be targeted
against states that commit atrocities against their own citizens.
It does not appear that imperfection of government stands in the way of
such a system. There is no reason to think that imperfect governments would
ignore the crossborder altruism of their citizens any more than any other values or
interests. Indeed, dictatorships as well as democracies have at least made a show
of expressing concern about the well being of citizens in foreign states. The
Soviet Union, for example, represented itself as a defender of the working class
everywhere in the world.
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Many scholars argue that dictatorships should enjoy less sovereignty: they
should be excluded from the benefits of membership in international
organizations72 or even subject to invasion by liberal democracies, which would
then install a democratic regime.73 This argument is vulnerable to many practical
objections: it is unclear that foreign states can successfully install democratic
institutions; invasions might result in civil war; adequate interventions may be too
expensive and risky; and so forth. But for present purposes the most difficult
problem with this view is that it is in tension with interstate cooperation. Suppose,
for example, that a successful treaty that reduced global warming needed the
participation of China. If China must be excluded from international
organizations, or even invaded, because of its authoritarian system, then global
climate control cannot be achieved. If China is included, then a dictatorship has
benefited from international cooperation. This problem is ubiquitous in
international relations because even small countries have very important
resources, are needed for international goals (for example, tracking down
terrorists who hide in them), and can easily dissolve into anarchy if invaded or
isolated. As a result, the optimal sovereignty rule is ambiguous: it might favor
treating dictatorships like democracies (so that global collective goods can be
created through cooperation in the short term) or treating dictatorships as pariahs
(in order to encourage regime change for the sake of the dictatorship’s
population).74
3. Imperfect Governments; Imperfect Enforcement
Enforcement problems, however, seriously complicate this analysis. We
can point to two distinct problems.
First, what motives do foreign governments have for intervening? Even if
they are perfect, they will intervene only if intervention improves the welfare of
domestic citizens. If the foreign governments are imperfect, they may intervene
even when doing so does not enhance the welfare (altruistic or otherwise) of their
citizens. If the law relaxes sovereignty when a humanitarian crisis occurs, then
foreign states, taking advantage of the law, may intervene but not in order to
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alleviate the humanitarian crisis. They may intervene for other strategic reasons.
This is the pretext problem.
Second, even if foreign governments are altruistic, there is a free rider
problem. If a humanitarian crisis in state X can be solved through elimination of
the government of X, then all states (assuming altruism) benefit from the
elimination of that government. Thus, every state maximizes its welfare by
refusing to intervene in the hope that some other state will intervene. Even if
some intervention occurs, it is likely to be less than what would be optimal.
Further, states are likely to free ride in punishing states that fail to intervene, or
that intervene but do so for strategic reasons (that make things worse) rather than
for altruistic reasons.
These problems are not decisive, but they illustrate the risks. A rule of
exceptionless or absolute sovereignty would allow governments to abuse their
own citizens but (assuming imperfect enforcement) discourage governments from
invading other countries using humanitarianism as a pretext. A rule that permits
or requires humanitarian interventions would discourage governments from
abusing their citizens but encourage governments to launch invasions for strategic
reasons.
4. Evidence: Law and History
As noted, many elements of international law reflect altruistic concern for
the well being of people living across borders. Human rights treaties oblige states
to respect certain human rights.75 International humanitarian law reduces the
brutality of war.76 International criminal law makes individuals liable for
committing certain atrocities.77 And, as discussed in Part I, some commentators
support a right of humanitarian intervention.
However, these legal regimes are weak and rarely enforced. History
suggests two reasons why. First, although crossborder altruism exists, it is
minimal. Foreign aid, which is the most direct evidence of altruism, is very low,
and usually tied to strategic goals.78 Humanitarian interventions have been rare
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and limited. The clearest recent example of humanitarian intervention was
America’s ill-fated famine relief operation in Somalia; the U.S. withdrew after a
small number of combat deaths.79 Most other examples cited in the literature
actually reflect mixed motives. The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and the
Tanzanian intervention in Uganda may have helped the citizens in the invaded
states but the purpose of the invasions was security.80 The Kosovo example is
more complicated but the contrast between intervention in Kosovo and the failure
to intervene in Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur today suggests that regional security,
not humanitarianism, is the distinguishing factor.81
Second, to the extent that all people are altruistic, all people benefit when
atrocities in a foreign state are halted: this suggests a collective action problem.
Even if preventing genocide in Rwanda benefits all states, all states would be
even better off if other states took the considerable risk of sending in military
troops. The international legal regime has not been able to overcome this problem
of collective action.
As a practical and legal matter, then, sovereignty remains robust even
though in a world with perfect governments (putting aside the government that
commits atrocities) and perfect enforcement, sovereignty would be limited so that
states could not commit atrocities against their own citizens. The problem is not
so much that governments are imperfect but that altruism is limited and collective
action problems are severe.
C. Cooperation
Global welfarism implies that states should cooperate with each other in
order to produce supranational (regional or global) public goods such as climate
control and trade. There is no such obligation to cooperate because states have
strong nonlegal incentives to cooperate, but there is an important regime
governing the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of treaties.
1. Perfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
values foreigners at 1/2000 the value of an American life); Jean-Sebastien Rioux and Douglas A.
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Why should states cooperate? Let’s consider a simple example. A territory
contains a factory and a resident who lives downwind. When the factory operates,
it produces a benefit for its owner (B) and a cost to the downwind resident (C).
Operation of the factory is desirable if and only if B > C.
If the factory and the resident occupy the territory of a single state, the
government of the state can create a law that ensures that the factory operates only
if it is socially desirable. For example, a law that provides that the factory may
operate only if B > C is socially desirable; so is a law that requires the factory to
pay C to the victim if it operates. In the latter case, the factory will internalize the
social cost of its operations, and operate only if B > C. In addition, the state could
determine whether the factory’s operations are socially beneficial and pass a law
banning operation of the factory if they are not.
Suppose now that the factory is in state X, and the pollution it generates
crosses a border and harms a person who lives in state Y. From the perspective of
global welfare, it remains the case that a law that forces factory owners to
internalize the costs of production is desirable. However, state X no longer has an
incentive to pass such a law. The problem is that state X’s citizen – the factory
owner – is harmed by a law that penalizes the factory for polluting, and no one in
state X benefits from such a law. Therefore, state X will not pass such a law.
State Y’s citizen is victimized by the pollution but, because state Y has no
control over the factory owner, state Y gains nothing by passing an anti-pollution
law. Perhaps, state Y will try to bribe state X to pass the law. If the victim is
injured more than the factory owner gains, the bribe might be possible. But it
might not. I will return to this issue shortly.
Suppose that each state has a factory and a citizen. State X’s factory
pollutes the drinking water of state Y’s citizen; and state Y’s factory pollutes the
drinking water of state X’s citizen. Would each state pass globally welfaremaximizing laws?
If they are unable to cooperate, the answer is no. State X’s law benefits no
one in state X, and harms X’s factory owner; therefore state X will not pass the
law. The same logic ensures that state Y also does not pass a law.
However, state X and state Y could agree to enter a treaty that provides
that each state must pass a law that restricts pollution. The treaty could provide
that each state must pass a law that prohibits pollution if the benefits (to the
factory owner in the state) are less than the costs (to the citizens in both states). In
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other words, the treaty would require each state to act as if crossborder costs were
actually incurred by its own citizens.
If the two states can cooperate in this fashion, then the outcome is globally
welfare-maximizing, and to the same extent as the outcome in the one-state case.
But this is an exceptionally simple case. In the real world, there are two obstacles
to cooperation: asymmetry and third-country effects.
Asymmetry. By asymmetry, I mean that the cost/benefit ratio is different
for each state. Suppose, for example, that the factory in state X (which I will call
factory X) produces an in-state benefit of 50 and an out-of-state cost of 100.
Factory Y produces an in-state benefit of 50 and an out-of-state cost of 10. Table
1 provides the numbers.
Table 1
Factory in X
Factory in Y
Both

Welfare Effect in X
Owner
Victim
50
0
0
-10
40

Welfare Effect in Y
Owner
Victim
0
-100
50
0
-50

Global Effect
-50
40
-10

Consider a treaty that bans all pollution. Such a treaty would benefit Y
(whose factory loses 50 but whose citizen gains 100) but would harm X (whose
factory loses 50 but whose citizen gains only 10). Thus, X would refuse to enter
such a treaty. Or consider a treaty that permits only cost-justified pollution. Such
a treaty would benefit Y (whose factory loses zero but whose citizen gains 100)
but would harm X (whose factory loses 50 and whose citizen gains zero). X
would reject this treaty.
It is possible that Y could persuade X to sign one of these treaties
(preferably the second) by making a side payment to X. Suppose that Y says that
if X agrees to enter a treaty banning cost-unjustified pollution, then Y will pay X
somewhere between 50 and 100. Both states would be better off after such a deal
than in the status quo. However, states rarely make side payments of this sort to
each other, and the reason is probably that they create perverse incentives. If state
X knows that Y will pay it to reduce pollution, then it might encourage its
entrepreneurs to set up factories close to the border with Y, and then threaten to
operate them unless Y pays X more money. I will return to this problem later.
Third-Country Effects. Two states might cooperate with each other with
the purpose of injuring third states. The Nazi-Soviet pact, which carved up
Poland, is one such example. Other examples are less dramatic but no less
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important. Trade economists have long recognized that a bilateral free trade pact
can result in trade diversion that may destroy the welfare effects of the pact.82
Briefly, when states X and Y agree to reduce tariffs while excluding Z, X and Y
may produce and export to each other products that are more cheaply
manufactured by Z because the tariff reduction offsets Z’s competitive advantage.
In theory, the aggregate welfare of the three countries could be lower than if all
three have higher but equal tariffs. But even when this does not occur, third party
effects can result in delay and other distortions, as states fight to avoid being
excluded while trying to exclude others.
There is no bilateral solution to this problem; only a multilateral treaty
regime could solve this problem. The GATT/WTO system is such an effort: the
most-favored nation system ensures that X, Y, and Z, in our example, all have the
same tariffs. But GATT/WTO’s system is vulnerable to free riding, and indeed
trade diversion has been accomplished through regional trade agreements, which
have flourished despite their formal illegality under GATT/WTO.83
Whether the international trade regime should be considered a success or
not, the larger point is that bilateral cooperation cannot by itself solve collective
action problems, and indeed may exacerbate them by providing additional ways
for states to harm third countries – as the Nazi-Soviet pact shows.84
Summary. Perfect governments will enter treaties in order to produce
collective goods, but even with perfect enforcement, there are significant
obstacles to international welfare-maximization. One obstacle is asymmetry of
payoffs: states will not enter globally welfare maximizing treaties if one state
loses, and although side payments could in principle solve this problem, side
payments are often hard to administer or invite misbehavior. The other obstacle is
the third-country effect: cooperation among two states can reduce global welfare
because of the ubiquity of externalities in the international setting, and the
absence of institutions to correct them.
2. Imperfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
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Because governments are imperfect, the treaties they enter may not reflect
the interests of all their citizens. The Holy Alliance of 1815, for example, was a
treaty among authoritarian states – Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and
Prussia – that obliged each to render assistance to the other in case a state’s own
people threatened its monarchy. Such a treaty protected the ruling elites at the
expense of the general public. A more prosaic example, albeit one of great
importance today, is the World Trade Organization, which, according to its
critics, benefits export industries at the expense of consumers, farmers, and
workers.85 Another modern example is sovereign debt incurred by ruling elites in
order to finance their own lavish lifestyle rather than development for the sake of
taxpayers who eventually have to pay back the principal plus interest.86
One interesting question is whether such welfare-reducing treaties should
be enforceable. To see why this question matters, suppose that two dictatorships
enter a treaty that reduces the welfare of both populations. Subsequently, one of
the states goes through a regime change. The resulting government is
democratic.87 The government would like to repudiate the treaty; may it?
The usual answer is no. To take a typical example, a democratic state may
not repudiate sovereign debt incurred by a prior dictatorship for the personal gain
of its leaders. If it does so, it risks a sanction. But why shouldn’t states be
permitted to escape such bad treaties?
One possible answer is that even dictatorships, and certainly less imperfect
governments, will enter most treaties for domestically welfare-maximizing
reasons. Recall that dictators do not have an incentive to forgo policies that
generate public goods; they do best by choosing those policies and then exploiting
their citizens through the tax system. Thus, when dictators enter treaties, the
presumption should be that the treaties are designed to maximize welfare, not
injure their citizens. To be sure, the citizens will rarely benefit, or benefit much
from such treaties, but they will not be hurt by them. At the same time, some
treaties like these will benefit citizens in some cases, and almost always the
citizens of democratic counterparties. So a general rule in favor of enforcement
seems to be welfare-maximizing.88
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3. Imperfect Governments; Imperfect Enforcement
Enforcement and administrative difficulties may undermine the value of a
treaty. Imagine that state X and Y enter a treaty prohibiting cost-unjustified
pollution, with a side payment. New factories are constructed on the territory of
Y, and these factories emit pollution that crosses the border. X protests, but Y
argues that the pollution is cost-justified, or that the factories are not of the type
that are governed by the treaty. How is the dispute to be resolved?
In the one-state example, we know that the victims of pollution can bring a
lawsuit against the factory owners. The court will resolve the dispute, and even if
the court misinterprets the law, the law can be modified by the legislature. But the
treaty in question did not establish a dispute resolution mechanism, and as long as
Y can plausibly claim that the pollution is cost-justified (we assume that an
implausible claim will be treated as a treaty violation, resulting in a reputational
sanction of some sort), X will have no remedy. Nor is renegotiation of the treaty
likely to solve the problem: Y will refuse to renegotiate unless X offers a new side
payment.
X and Y could try to anticipate this problem by providing in the treaty that
a tribunal will hear any disputes – either an existing international tribunal such as
the International Court of Justice or a new tribunal established for the occasion.
However, the ICJ has proven a disappointment and new tribunals are also not
likely to be effective.89 The reason is that human beings must make the decision,
and the people who staff the tribunal must come from X or Y or both (or neither).
If the people are loyal to their own government, then the tribunal will either
deadlock or find for whichever state has more representation. Anticipating such
an outcome, the states will be reluctant to agree to the tribunal, and indeed
effective tribunals are rare.90 Relying on people who are not nationals of either
party is also unacceptably risky because such people cannot usually be trusted to
take account of the parties’ interests.91
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All of these problems could be solved, in principle, if X and Y merged
into a single state. Consider the example in Table 1 above. If X and Y merge into
a single state, which I will call “XY,” then all the factories and all the residents
are now subject to the same government. If the government seeks to maximize the
welfare of its citizens, then it will pass legislation that ensures that the socially
optimal level of pollution is created. Factory X will shut down, and Factory Y will
stay open.
If merger would solve these problems, why don’t state X and state Y
merge? State X and Y will merge only if the governments of both states believe
that merger will enhance the welfare of their citizens. In our example, merger will
enhance the welfare of Victim Y by 100 and reduce the welfare of Factory Y by
50, so we might imagine that the government of Y would agree to the merger.
However, merger would enhance the welfare of victim X by only 10 and reduce
the welfare of Factory X by 100, so the government of Y would reject the merger.
To be sure, a merger with side payments might be possible, but it might also be
difficult.
In addition, merger would solve the enforcement and administrative
problems discussed above. The government of XY could pass laws that regulate
pollution, set up an agency with the power to create and enforce rules, provide for
adjudication, enforce the laws, and so forth. However, all of these functions could
benefit the residents of former state X more than the residents of former state Y or
vice versa. If the governments of these states anticipate such asymmetric effect
before they merge, then they might not agree to merge in the first place.
In sum, the treaty rule that states X and Y would agree to is likely to be
inferior to the domestic law that merged state XY would pass. If the ideal rule
provides that factories may pollute only when benefits exceed costs, then state
XY may well be able to incorporate this rule in domestic law, but the treaty
between states X and Y would likely provide a weaker rule – for example,
restricting only certain types of heavily polluting factories, or only particularly
heavy pollution, or only factories close to the border or in certain regions. To be
sure, the treaty rule will be better than no treaty at all.
There are two implications here. First, the practical significance of this
result is that we should not be surprised by the weakness and imperfection of
treaties, such as the Kyoto treaty, or the weaker version of Kyoto that the U.S.
would agree to.92 Treaties, unlike domestic law, must not only be welfare92
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maximizing; they must also be Pareto-superior for all treaty parties. The more
states that are involved, and the more heterogeneous their positions, the weaker
that treaties will be.
Second, we should rarely observe treaties that redistribute wealth from one
state to another. Every treaty creates a surplus, but the surplus will be distributed
to parties according to their bargaining power, not their need. This being the case,
there is no point in demanding that treaties like the Kyoto treaty require some
states to make sacrifices while not requiring other states to: states will not agree to
such a result. If a wealthy state wants to provide aid to a poor state, it can best do
this by providing direct aid, as I will discuss below.
4. Evidence: Law and History
Both of these observations are supported by history. Most treaties impose
weak obligations and do not have asymmetric distributive impacts.93 Despite
some claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that international law recognizes
a duty on the part of wealthy states to accept greater international obligations than
poor states do.94 In addition, as noted above, international law does not
distinguish treaties that more or less imperfect governments ratify: all are
enforceable under international law except (ambiguously) if they violate jus
cogens norms such as the norm against genocide.95
As for the third-country effect, I have already discussed the way that the
international trade regime has tried to cabin bilateral cooperation that harms third
countries. Another example is the UN collective security system, which was
supposed to replace the bilateral (or low-number) security pacts that contributed
to the first and second world wars. But if these two multilateral regimes provide
evidence that states recognize the danger of third-country effects, they do not
show that this danger can be overcome. The problem is that the third-country
problem can be solved only though collective action involving all or nearly all
states, and collective action of this scope and magnitude may not be possible. The
international trade regime shows ambiguous success – but probably because only
three players, the EU, Japan, and the U.S., really matter. Whether the trade system
can survive a larger number of equal players remains to be seen. The collective
security system has largely failed to achieve the goals of its founders. There are
regional successes – including NATO, the EU system, and NAFTA – but these
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successes are based either on the small number of parties or the dominance of a
few large parties.
Finally, there is no general rule of international law that the treaties of
dictatorships are less enforceable than the treaties of democracies. On the
contrary, international law has always been clear that international obligations do
not turn on the political regime of a state.
D. Aid
Wealthier states have no international legal obligation to provide aid to
poorer states, although wealth disparities are vast, far greater than intrastate
wealth disparities that uncontroversially result in domestic redistributive
legislation. Wealthier states do provide aid to other states, and usually to poor (but
not always the poorest) states, but on a voluntary basis. Global welfare
maximization implies significant redistribution, far greater than what exists today,
at least if the transfers actually reach the poor and are not confiscated by dictators
or corrupt bureaucrats.
1. Perfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
Here, we see the starkest contrast between the implications of global
welfare maximization and the limitations that result from the requirement of state
consent. Assume first that the citizens of wealthy states are not altruistic toward
poor people living in foreign states (or are able to exhaust their altruism through
private contributions). Wealthy states would, then, refuse to agree to international
law that required them to transfer resources to foreign states because such a law
would make the populations of wealthy states worse off. Assume now that
citizens have some altruism toward foreign citizens. In principle, wealthy states
would not object to international law that requires them to donate aid, as long as
the level of donation does not exceed the extent of their citizens’ altruism.
However, although such an international law would not injure wealthy
states, there is also no an affirmative reason for it. Wealthy states could simply
donate on their own free will. A treaty might help donor states coordinate their
giving, but this could probably be done informally, as there are only about a
dozen or so states that provide significant aid, and also assumes that the donor
states have similar altruistic interests, which is not clear.
2. Imperfect Governments; Perfect Enforcement
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Imperfect donor governments may donate too much or too little aid,
relative to what is welfare-maximizing for their populations, but the more serious
problem is the imperfection of donee governments. It is widely agreed that much,
perhaps most, foreign aid has been squandered because it has been confiscated by
donee governments, lost to corruption, or misused in some way.96
Consider a donee government that is a dictatorship. Subject to the
insurrection constraint, it keeps all surpluses from government policy for itself. A
naïve donor government that gave money to the donee government would not
maximize welfare, for the donee government would keep the money for itself and
not give any money to its citizens. Because the leader and high officials of the
donee government are already wealthy, the donation would not enhance welfare.
One possible solution to this problem is to make future donations
conditional on the proper use of the current donation. Suppose, for example, that
the donor government says that it will give $1 million to the donee government; if
this money is not used for food aid for poor citizens, then the donor government
will not in future donate any more money.97
There are two problems with this solution. First, the increased food aid
may substitute for some other good that goes toward satisfaction of the
insurrection constraint. Suppose, for example, that the dictatorship already
maintains medical clinics for the poor, in part to discourage insurrection. If the
dictatorship now is required to give food to the poor, so that the insurrection
constraint is exceeded, the dictatorship would rationally reduce medical care.
Thus, the donation would not enhance the welfare of the poor.
Second, the dictatorship may give a very small amount to the poor, keep
the rest for itself, and then inform the donor government that people will starve
unless the donor makes a new donation. This is a version of the Samaritan’s
dilemma.98 Donor nations may be able to credibly threaten not to donate more aid
unless the donee gives at least some of it to the poor, but in equilibrium the donor
will have to, in essence, “bribe” the donee government in order to ensure that
some of the aid reaches the poor. The cost of bribery reduces the altruistic return
to a donation, thus reducing the equilibrium level of donation itself.
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3. Imperfect Governments; Imperfect Enforcement
As noted above, an international legal system governing aid could be
useful if there is a collective action problem. If all donor nations benefit when the
level of poverty in a donee nation is reduced, then such a collective action
problem exists. A legal system that required states to donate a certain amount of
aid could make them better off, against a baseline where they make unilateral
donations based on the altruism of their citizens.
No such system exists, and the most likely reasons are: (1) the wealthy
states can accomplish the same goals through informal negotiation; given the
small number of donor states, it is not clear that legalization would be necessary.
(2) The wealthy states (or their citizens) may have different views about where
aid should go, and what type of aid should be supplied. Thus, there may not be
sufficient agreement for a legal regime. (3) There is the free rider problem;
wealthy states may be unwilling to sanction other wealthy states that fail to
donate, other than by failing to donate themselves, in which case no aid is
provided.
To solve this problem, Thomas Pogge proposes what he calls a Global
Resources Dividend or GRD. A GRD is a tax on the production or use of natural
resources, whose proceeds are to be disbursed to the poorest states. As an
example, Pogge suggests a $2 tax on crude oil extraction; such a tax would raise
several hundred billion dollars annually, enough to bring more than 2 billion
people above the World Bank’s poverty line. Transparent rules would require that
more money go to countries that make the most progress in eradicating poverty.
As for enforcement, an agency would identify states that violate their obligations,
and then all other states would be required to impose tariffs on imports from and
perhaps exports to that country.99 Pogge argues that his scheme is realistic
because the GRD is more morally compelling than conventional forms of aid; it
avoids a collective action problem by forcing states to commit themselves to
making contributions; and it has prudential benefits, as countries beset by poverty
and misery pose security threats to wealthy nations.100
Pogge’s attention to institutional dimensions is welcome but his arguments
are not persuasive. As he acknowledges, existing foreign aid reflects mostly
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strategic interests and the altruistic component is very small.101 He suggests that
states would be more altruistic if asked to join a program like his, which, he says,
is consistent with a diverse array of ethical theories; but unilateral aid is also
consistent with these ethical theories. In fact, Pogge’s scheme is worse, from an
ethical standpoint, than unilateral donation because it would almost certainly
cause more harm than good. The tax would fall on the billions of people who
make more than the World Bank’s $2/day threshold but are still extremely poor,
who would have to pay more for the products and services they consume: bus
fares, housing, food, clothing – the prices of all these products will rise because
oil and other natural resources are factors in their production. As for the people
below the $2/day threshold, we know from experience that many of them will not
receive any benefits, even while they will have to pay higher prices.102 Pogge
acknowledges that some governments will misuse aid; these governments will be
deprived of the aid.103 Yet their citizens will still have to pay higher prices for any
imported goods, or domestic goods that use imported inputs, while receiving none
of the benefits. Further, Pogge does not explain how states can solve their
collective action problem simply by agreeing to the GRD program. States have
strong incentives to violate their obligations, and other states would have strong
incentives not to punish them by engaging in trade protectionism, which in any
event would throw the entire global trading system into disarray. Indeed, this kind
of problem – which is ubiquitous in the international arena and has defeated many
schemes more modest than Pogge’s – would also undermine his agency, which is
vulnerable to manipulation for political reasons. Finally, the prudential benefits
that Pogge attributes to his system – greater security for the rich nations if
impoverished nations are made better off – are no different from those claimed for
the current unilateral system.
The existing aid scheme is, by any measure, ungenerous, but it is an
artifact of the division of the world into self-governing states. If a single world
state existed, a more generous income transfer scheme would exist – a scheme
similar to the kind that we see in nation states today – because the poor would
influence government policy. But one would also have to recognize that massive
agency costs and the heterogeneity of preferences would make the world
government’s provision of public goods extremely poor, so that the welfare gains
101

Id., at 207 (“the disbursement of conventional development assistance is governed by political
considerations”).
102
See, e.g., Rieff, supra.
103
The fact is that almost all government misuse aid – much of it ends up in the pockets of corrupt
officials. So Pogge’s system would most likely simply enrich government officials at the expense
of poor people who must pay higher prices or, if it were enforced rigorously, benefit a few poor
people in a few states at the expense of poor people who live elsewhere.

46

from superior redistribution might be wiped out. More useful than imagining such
a system or advocating schemes like Pogge’s is the more mundane process of
understanding how the minimal amount of aid that existing states are willing to
disburse is best used to address short-term crises and to promote lasting
development.104
4. Evidence: Law and History
As noted above, the evidence suggests that crossborder altruism exists but
is minimal. States have not agreed to international obligations to provide aid; the
wealthy states do provide some aid but only on a voluntary basis. Some of it is
direct; some of it is administered through institutions such as the World Bank.
The latter and other institutions ensure that aid is coordinated and is not
redundant, but otherwise states remain free to donate as much or as little aid as
they wish.
E. Summary
If governments are perfect agents for their citizens, and enforcement is
perfect, then globally welfare-maximizing international law would mainly prevent
governments from preying on each other and encourage them to cooperate with
each other. The principle of sovereignty accomplishes the first task, and we would
observe multilateral treaties that require states to cooperate in the production of
global collective goods such as climate control. However, these treaties would not
produce optimal collective goods because of asymmetry and distributional
problems; indeed, they likely would produce outcomes not much better than what
we observe today. In addition, international law would not force states to transfer
wealth to each other – neither directly, in the form of aid, nor indirectly, in the
form of acquiescence in international treaties that distribute cooperate surpluses
on the basis of need rather than bargaining power. Supranational institutions
would likewise respect existing wealth and power distributions rather than change
them.
If governments are imperfect agents for their citizens, and enforcement is
perfect, then globally welfare-maximizing international law would be weaker.
The problem is that dictatorships – and even democracies – will not necessarily
agree to welfare-maximizing international law because such law may help people
within their states who do not have political power. A new tradeoff also
complicates matters: should democratic states cooperate with dictatorships in
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order to generate mutually beneficial surpluses (such as trade, climate control, and
so forth), or refuse to cooperate with dictatorships in order to undermine and
discourage them? To the extent that the latter strategy is globally welfaremaximizing, then international law will have narrower scope.
If, in addition, enforcement is imperfect, then the scope of institutionally
constrained welfare-maximizing international law shrinks even further. To the
extent that states free ride on legal structures designed to generate public goods,
these legal structures will not receive state consent in the first place (or will
simply be ignored). The weakness of collective action may favor the traditional,
more robust conception of sovereignty, but the extent to which it does so depends
on empirical parameters about which there is little information.
All of my assumptions are empirical, and readers may disagree about
them, but even if we vary them considerably, the overall conclusions would
remain similar. Suppose, for example, that preferences are not as heterogeneous
as they appear, or that – as globalization proceeds – the current heterogeneity of
preferences declines. The predicted outcome would be a reduction in the number
of states, but not in any general change in the state system. With fewer states,
international cooperation would be easier than it is today, but the history of
interstate cooperation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – when
the number of states was less than a third of the number today – provides reason
to think that the system overall would be similar.
Or, suppose that agency costs are not as high as they appear, or that – as
technology like the Internet improves – agency costs decrease further. One might
predict that governments become more democratic, or that authoritarian
governments become more responsive to the interests of citizens. As a result,
international treaties, like other aspects of government policy, would improve – at
least, to the extent that states maintain cooperative, rather than rivalrous,
approaches to foreign relations. But states would continue to be jealous of their
sovereignty, indeed would become less likely to merge, and more likely to break
apart, with the result that the collective action problem would worsen.
International law thus might either improve or weaken – it is impossible to tell,
but there is no reason for optimism.
Finally, suppose that the collective action problem is not as severe as it
appears, or that – as monitoring technologies improve or better international
structures are built – the collective action problem diminishes over time. States
would cooperate more; multilateral treaties would have thicker obligations and
enjoy more parties. But states would remain separate; indeed, the incentive for
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states to merge would decline, and states might even break apart, as smaller units
realize that they can take advantage of international cooperation. If this is so, the
collective action problem would be aggravated.
IV. SOME OTHER QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Why States, Rather than Individuals or Supranational Entities, Make
International Law
If individuals made international law – for example, by voting for
delegates, who then passed laws by majority rule in an assembly – then there
would be no international law; there would be a world government, and all law
would be domestic. The reason that we do not have such a system is that
preferences are heterogeneous. People group into states, and the state system is
relatively stable, showing no movement toward a world government system.
From time to time, people suggest that supranational entities should make
international law. For example, the European Union makes law, albeit in a highly
limited fashion, for its members. If the suggestion means that a supranational
entity such as the UN should make international law, and that entity operates
through majority rule of delegates chosen on the basis of proportional
representation of people, then the suggestion amounts to the argument that there
should be a world government. A world government is a supranational entity. If
the suggestion means that various regional supranational entities – the European
Union, an American Union, and so forth – should make international law, then it
is just an argument that the current state system should be replaced with a state
system with fewer states. The reason we do not have such a system is that, outside
Europe (and increasingly, it appears within Europe as well105) preferences are so
heterogeneous that smaller states rather than larger states appear to be the trend.
The nation state appears to be the entity that most effectively trades off
scale economies and preference heterogeneities. To obtain supranational
collective goods, then, states must cooperate with each other. They do so chiefly
by creating international law. Supranational bodies at the regional level
apparently are possible – at least in Europe – but they cannot produce global
collective goods, and in any event they remain rare.
B. Why Individuals Do Not Have (Many) Obligations Under International Law
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States are responsible for most international law violations; individuals are
not. For example, if a state denies overflight rights to another state in violation of
a treaty, the state is legally responsible; the persons who adopted the policy, gave
the orders, or fulfilled the orders are not legally responsible. The state that
violated the treaty may be legally required to pay reparations or take some other
action.106
To understand this rule, imagine that two states agree to reduce
crossborder pollution. Each state has an interest in seeing that the rule is enforced,
but neither state has an interest in how the other state enforces the rule. One state
might find that criminal penalties are the best way to prevent its own factory
owners from polluting across the border, while the other state might instead use
zoning laws and prohibit the construction of factories within a certain distance
from the border. In other words, the creation of the public good is consistent with
a diverse range of internal legal systems, and if international law were to make
individuals liable, it would interfere with whatever internal system that might be
best for a particular state.
One might fear that if states, not individuals, are liable, then international
law cannot have teeth. What if states enter treaties but then make no effort to
force their citizens to comply with them? To answer this question, one must know
why the state does not comply with the treaty. If the answer is that circumstances
have changed, and the state no longer has an interest in complying with the treaty,
then it will not want individuals to be liable. The lack of individual liability
ensures that the decision to comply with or violate the treaty remains at the level
of government. This is surely the reason why individual liability is not common.
Another reason for refraining from individual liability is the problem of
bias. If the individual responsible for an international law violation is prosecuted
by the victim state, then the state has no incentive to respect the individual’s
rights – he or she is not a citizen. If the individual is prosecuted by his or her own
state, then the state has no incentive to ensure that the individual is properly
prosecuted and punished – the victim is not a citizen. In theory, the other state can
object if the trial is biased, but in practice it is very difficult to tell whether a trial
is biased or not. This is why diplomats who are accused of committing crimes are
expelled rather than tried.
But individual liability does exist for a limited class of international law
violations – chiefly, international crimes.107 Soldiers who commit war crimes can
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be held individually liable – either by their own government or by foreign
governments. An early example of an international crime was that of piracy. A
government that caught a pirate could try and execute him even if the pirate had
not committed any crime on that government’s territory or in its territorial seas
and even if the pirate had not committed a crime against that government’s
nationals. The reason was probably that the pirate’s own government had no
control over him, so governments victimized by piracy could not lodge a protest
with the pirate’s government and expect any recourse. In the absence of effective
recourse against the state, individual liability was a second best solution –
although bringing with it certain risks, such as politically biased prosecutions.
It is questionable whether this logic applies to modern war crimes.
Soldiers, unlike pirates, are controlled by governments. Perhaps this explains
why, although international criminal liability exists as a category of international
law, actual prosecutions remain extremely rare.108
C. Why States (Usually) Have the Same Legal Obligations Regardless of Political
System, Size, Power, or Wealth
Wouldn’t welfare-maximizing international law impose fewer obligations
on large states than on small states because large states are responsible for the
well being of a large number of people? Alternatively, or in addition, wouldn’t
such law impose greater obligations on powerful and wealthy states so that they
will use their power and wealth to help the poor living in other states? Instead,
international law imposes the same obligations on all states.
The last statement needs to be qualified in a few ways. The general rules
of international law impose the same obligations on all states; states are allowed
to adjust their obligations by treaty however they want to. In particular, customary
international law treats all states the same. Many major international legal
institutions, such as the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, are
based on the principle of sovereign equality, which means that all states are
treated equally.109 However, the United Nations cannot act in major ways without
the consent of the most powerful states; and the ICJ is also biased in their favor
and is in any event mostly ineffectual.110
The rough answer to the questions above is that if states efficiently
produce public goods for their citizens, then there is no reason for them to be
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required to help other states produce public goods for their citizens, or to be
allowed to interfere with those states. Large states produce public goods for more
people, but that doesn’t mean they should have the power to interfere with the
public good production of small states. If there are imbalances attributable to
wealth differences, these imbalances can be handled through aid.
But what if governments are imperfect? As noted above, dictatorships and
democracies have roughly the same incentives to choose policies that create
public goods, and so they should agree to similar kinds of international
obligations – the exception being for international obligations that prohibit
dictatorship and its means. In theory, democracies could enhance global welfare
by isolating and attacking dictatorships, and replacing the government with a
democratic government; in practice, this has proven far too difficult and risky
because dictatorships are hard to defeat, and a defeated dictatorship is often
replaced by another dictatorship or civil war. Thus, democratic states gain by
cooperating with dictatorships, and this benefits their own citizens; while there is
little reason to think that the citizens of dictatorships would be better off if
democracies refused to cooperate with dictatorships.
D. Why International Law Is Predominantly Legislative, and Has Weak Judicial
and Executive Institutions
International law consists of quite an elaborate set of laws, but has weak
judicial and executive institutions. Laws govern countless aspects of international
behavior – the use of force, the practice of war, trade, communications, transport,
the environment, and on and on.
Adjudicative institutions consist mainly of informal ad hoc arbitration.
The International Court of Justice has generally been ignored, as have a variety of
other lesser courts. It is too early to tell whether the International Criminal Court
will succeed or fail, but without the support of the United States and many of the
other major military powers, success seems likely to be limited. The only bright
spot is the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, but it is still in its infancy.111
As for executive institutions, there is only one – the UN security council,
which has the power to force states to comply with international law and the
exigencies of collective security. But five diverse states hold a veto, and the veto
power has ensured that the UN security council remains toothless; indeed, it has
never used its strongest power, the power to order states to use military force.112
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Thus, international legal institutions seem to be exceptionally thin and
unbalanced – as though, to use a domestic analogy, the United States congress
made laws only by unanimous rule, U.S. courts could hear cases but not enforce
their judgments or even compel litigants to appear before them, and no executive
existed and instead people relied on self-help to enforce their rights. Such a
system would seem to be a recipe for anarchism in the domestic realm; how could
it exist internationally?
The answer to this puzzle is straightforward. Prescriptive rules need the
consent of states, states know what they are agreeing to, and they agree to rules
only when they serve their interest. International law is usually thin – that is, it
requires states to do little beyond what they would ordinarily do – because diverse
states can agree to relatively little (except in bilateral settings). Still, international
rules exist and govern a broad range of activities because states want to solve the
problem of crossborder externalities. Adjudication and execution, however, are
backward looking, zero sum phenomena. One state must lose an adjudication, and
a state must also be the subject of execution. These states are not usually willing
to consent to this infringement on their power and sovereignty. Thus, when
executive and adjudicative institutions are proposed, states rarely consent to them
unless they have a veto right or some other means of escaping adverse actions or
judgments. But adjudication and execution usually can’t be effective unless the
parties involved delegate substantial discretion to an independent body that has a
small number of members who can act quickly and efficiently. States are not
willing to risk delegation for the same reason that they do not merge into larger
states: they fear that the people who form the body will not be sufficiently
responsive to heterogeneous preferences.113
CONCLUSION
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The reason that a world government does not exist is that the global
population is exceptionally diverse. If a world government were to spring into
existence, it would quickly find itself unable to satisfy all its citizens, who would
improve their position by seceding and establishing independent states. Thus, it is
unrealistic to expect that states would delegate substantial power to international
institutions that would implement the same policies that a hypothetical world
government would. Yet we know that some international institutions are possible;
so the question is what are the limits of international legal organization.
The strategy of this paper has been to make several simple assumptions –
the heterogeneity of preferences, the imperfection of governments, and the
difficulty of collective action – and then ask what kind of international legal
reform consistent with these assumptions is likely to advance global welfare. The
conclusion is that international law and organization are likely to remain thin and
weak in the foreseeable future, but that within these constraints improvement is
possible. Those who advocate legal reform should focus on modest revisions that
are consistent both with global welfarism and institutional constraints.
A recurrent example of this argument has been humanitarian intervention:
a new rule that permits humanitarian intervention might be justified; but if, as
Singer implies, humanitarian intervention can be legitimate only under the
auspices of a democratic United Nations,114 then we must stay with the status quo,
which means tolerating humanitarian crises, even genocide, on the ground that
unilateral intervention would make long-term aggression more likely. Another
example is Kyoto. An environmental treaty that places equal burdens on states is
more likely to obtain universal consent than one that discriminates in favor of the
poor. Even such a treaty, however, is vulnerable to the collective action problem.
Global climate change – like war – might be a problem that cannot be fully
solved. A third example is international criminal justice. The problem with the
International Criminal Court is that it requires states to delegate substantial power
to persons – the prosecutors, the judges – that they cannot control. Ad hoc
tribunals set up in response to specific events – such as the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals – have a greater chance of success because the states that
establish the tribunals can immunize their own nationals.115
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Singer, supra, at 144-48.
Another example is global antitrust law. Paul Stephan argues that an ambitious international
antitrust system is likely to fail because of institutional constraints. See Paul B. Stephan, Global
Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 174
(2005).
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The most visible example of the general problem is global distributional
justice. One can imagine, as a point of comparison, a democratic world
government that is responsive to the interests of billions of impoverished voters.
Such a government would surely redistribute much more wealth to the poor than
we observe today. But no world government exists or is foreseeable. In its
absence, we must make do with the state system. Because all or virtually all states
must consent to international law and institutions, wealthy states will never have a
legal obligation to contribute significant resources to poor states. Authors try to
evade this conclusion by proposing institutional reforms. But these reforms either
approximate a world government (usually a federalist version) or assume the
continuing existence of the state system. The first is by hypothesis unavailable;
the second does not solve the problem because the wealthy countries will veto any
significant distributive measures.116
People’s views about these conclusions will depend to a large extent about
intuitions about human psychology and other empirical realities, and diverse
intuitions are reasonable. The minimal conclusion to be drawn is that institutions
matter, and that philosophers and legal scholars who propose institutional reform
so that global justice may be achieved have the burden of explaining their
empirical assumptions. The problem can be encapsulated as the following
question: if a world government is not possible in the foreseeable future, as most
scholars assume, then why should radical reform of the UN or other elements of
the current international system be possible? To answer this question, one needs a
theory that explains what kind of institutional and legal reforms are compatible
with the empirical conditions that underlie the modern state system. I have
identified three such conditions: the heterogeneity of preferences, agency costs,
and collective action problems. The next step is for reformers to explain whether
they accept these conditions but disagree about their importance, or reject them
and have another theory of international institutions that support their reform
proposals.
The more ambitious conclusion is that international law is, and must be,
weak, and, specifically, cannot fully exploit opportunities for creating global
collective goods. The argument is that if the world population could create
institutions that created global collective goods, then it would also be able to
create a world government; if, as history seems to show, it cannot, then there is no
116

Cf. Young, supra, at 265-75. Her short-term solution works within the UN system, but she does
not explain why the powerful countries with the veto will acquiesce in redistribution or yield
power over international economic institutions. (She says they need to be “shamed” into it.) Her
long-term solution is “global democracy,” involving various democratic international
organizations, but she does not explain how such a system would be possible.
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reason to think that international law can do indirectly what a world government
would do directly were it possible.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Eric Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eposner@uchicago.edu
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